The use of e-payment system for e-commerce is making our day to day life more easy and convenient. In existing e-payment schemes, there are a number of security and efficiency issues to be addressed. To address such issues Yang et al. (2013) proposed an authenticated encryption scheme and an e-payment system based on this encryption scheme. Their scheme excluded the need of digital signature for authentication. They claimed that the computation costs can be greatly reduced. But recently Chaudhry et al. (2015) exposed the weaknesses of Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme. To overcome the weaknesses of Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme, they proposed improved authenticated encryption and e-payment schemes. However, our analysis shows that there are few security issues in their scheme. Direct use of private key in product with standard key size gives an opportunity to adversary. Based on these observations we propose an improved scheme for authenticated encryption. We also propose e-payment system using our encryption scheme. We give the security proof and performance analysis of our scheme.
Introduction
Since its introduction by Zhang (1997) , authenticated encryption scheme has become one of the essential techniques to providing security in modern communications. In traditional methods to guarantee integrity, unforgeability and confidentiality of communication, the sender first digitally signs message and then performs encryption. This scheme is called signature-then-encryption. But this method is not suitable for an environment which is resources constrained because it double folds the computation and other requirements. Authenticated encryption or signcryption simultaneously sign and encrypt messages in a single step with a computational cost significantly less than the traditional method. After the Zheng et al.'s authenticated encryption scheme many authenticated encryption schemes were proposed (Hwang and Chang, 2003; Hwang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2012 Li et al., , 2008 Tseng and Jan, 2002) .
Recently Yang et al. (2013) found that all the previous authenticated encryption schemes have to generate and verify the digital signature to accomplish message authentication and confidentiality. They also found that there is no practicable scheme which combines the functions of message authentication and encryption without constructing the digital signature. To address the above issues Yang et al. (2013) proposed an authenticated encryption scheme and e-payment scheme. They claimed that their schemes resist replay, man-in-middle, impersonation and identity theft attack while providing authenticity, integrity and privacy protection. Chaudhry et al. (2015) in their paper exposed that Yang et al.'s (2013) schemes are vulnerable to impersonation attack. They show that an adversary just having knowledge of public parameters can easily masquerade as a legal user. To overcome weaknesses of Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme they also proposed improved authenticated encryption and e-payment scheme.
In this paper, we cryptanalyse Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption and e-payment scheme and find that there are few security issues in their scheme. We show that the attacker having full control over communication channel can get the private key of the user and can fraud. To overcome the weaknesses of Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption and e-payment schemes we also proposed improved authenticated encryption and e-payment schemes. Our proposed authenticated encryption scheme provides the user authentication and the message encryption at the same time. So it can be used to design an e-payment scheme. The primitive e-payment scheme was proposed by Chaum (2013) . After this scheme many e-payment schemes were proposed (Chang et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2014; Xiaojun, 2010; Yen et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2011) . We will show that our e-payment scheme is more efficient than the existing epayment schemes.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the elliptic curves. We also review Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme in the same section. We give the cryptanalysis of the Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) scheme in Section 3. Section 4 defines the proposed improved authenticated encryption scheme and e-payment scheme based on this encryption scheme. We prove the security and discuss the performance of our schemes in Section 5. Finally we draw our conclusion in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Elliptic curve
This subsection tells about the elliptic curves. An elliptic curve (Menezes, 1993 ) E over a finite field F p is defined by an equation ( times). kP P P P P k = + + + KK Hasse's theorem gives a bound on the number of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field. According to this theorem if E(F p ) has order N, then we have Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme
Review of
In this subsection, we review Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme. This scheme is an improvement of Yang et al.'s (2013) authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. Yang et al.'s (2013) authenticated encryption scheme combines the functions of message authentication and encryption without constructing the digital signature. Chaudhry et al. (2015) exposed the weaknesses of Yang et al.'s (2013) authenticated encryption scheme. They show that an adversary can easily masquerade as a legitimate user by just knowing the public key of the user B. So Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack. To overcome the weaknesses of Yang et al.'s (2013) authenticated encryption scheme, they proposed an improved authenticated encryption scheme.
In this scheme, the system initialises and selects some parameters. It selects a finite field F p with a larger prime p > 2 160 and an elliptic curve E(F p ) over this finite field. It also chooses a point Q from the elliptic curve E(F p ) and symmetric key algorithm 
Cryptanalysis of Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) scheme
In this section we show that there are few security issues in Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme and hence in e-payment system. We show that an adversary A can derive the private key of sender A and can generate valid R and K pair.
This indicates that Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) scheme is not secure against impersonation attack. Before proceeding further we make some common assumptions. We assume that the adversary A is having full control over communication channel and can intercept, modify, insert or delete any message. We also assume that A is having access to identities and public keys of communication parties.
With the above assumptions we explain the impersonation attack on the Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme. For this, let A and B be two authorised users and A be the adversary. By performing the following steps, A can derive the private key of user A and can generate the valid R and K to deceive the receiver B.
Step 1 A intercepts the (C, R, T) sent by the user A and finds R = r(d ua + T)
Step 2 Then A computes the factors of R in Z p . It is noted that here p is order of the prime field F p over which the elliptic curve E(F p ) is defined. So size of p is not large. In standard parameters it may be of 160-256 bit size. With this size of p, there are algorithms available in literature to factorise a number in Z p .
Step 3 After getting factors of R, i.e., r and (
, adversary A finds inverse of
-1 in Z p which is also practically computable. Now A has (d ua + T) and
T. So he finds d ua by subtracting T from (d ua + T).
Step 4 Now A computes ( )
and encrypt the message M using k x and T 1 and send (C, R, T 1 ) to user B.
Step 5 After receiving (C, R, T 1 ), the user B computes K = R(P ua + T 1 Q)d ub , which is same as .
ub rP User B decrypts the message using k x . He also verifies received T 1 and computed k x are same as they are present in decrypted message. User B perceives A as the legal user. 
Based on this analysis, we can say that Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme is not secure. The weakness of Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme also affects their e-payment scheme. Because of this weakness adversary A can purchase electronics goods on behalf of legal user A, where as the bank will deduct bill amount from user A′s account.
Proposed authenticated encryption scheme and e-payment scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed authenticated encryption scheme. We also give the improved e-payment scheme.
Proposed authenticated encryption scheme
It can be easily seen that weakness of Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme was due to design of R and K, so Chaudhry et al. (2015) improved the calculation of these two parameters in their scheme. But our analysis shows that these R and K are not secure, because the design of R is just product of two integers in Z p , with a standard size of p. So we further improve the calculation of these parameters during authenticated encryption and verification phases. Our proposed scheme can be described in following phases:
• Initialisation phase: in this phase, the system initialises and selects the same parameters as in Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) • Authenticated encryption: in this phase, a legal user A, who wants to send a message M to another user B, performs the following steps:
Step 1 User A chooses random integers r 1 and r 2 ∈ Z p , a random point P ∈ R E(F p ) and computes R 1 = r 1 P ua , R 2 = r 2 P. He also uses his identity ID ua to compute h = H(ID ua ).
Step 2 Now A computes
where d ua is private key of user A.
Step 3 Finally user A computes ( || || || )
using symmetric key k x , where ID ua is the identity of user A and T is current time stamp. He sends (C, R 1 , R 2 , T, ID ua ) to user B.
• Verification phase: after receiving (C, R 1 , R 2 , T, ID ua ), user B decrypts the message and verifies by the following steps:
Step 1 First user B computes h = H(ID ua ).
Step 2 Now B uses his private key d ub and h to compute
Step 3 Now B uses k x to decrypt C by ( ) ( || || || )
and checks if T is valid or not. It T is valid, then B verifies k x . If T and k x both are valid, then B consider that M is actually sent by A. Otherwise B rejects it.
Improved e-payment system using proposed scheme
We have proved in Section 3, that Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) scheme is not secure, hence their scheme is not suitable for the applications such as e-payment system and e-voting, etc. So in this section we proposed an improved e-payment system using our proposed authenticated encryption scheme. The proposed e-payment scheme can be divided into five phases: initialising phase, buying phase, paying phase, exchanging phase and last transferring phase. The details of this improved e-payment scheme are as follows:
• Initialising phase: in this phase, the system initialises and publishes the public parameters E(F p ), E k (.), D k (.), Q and P i defined same as in section 2.2. In this e-payment scheme customer A, bank B and the merchant have private/public keys
• Buying phase: in this phase, a legal customer A who wants to purchase some electronic goods downloads goods information (GI) from merchant's website. After this, the customer uses GI to generate the payment information and encrypts the information using the proposed authenticated encryption scheme. Also he sends the encrypted information to bank for paying the money. This phase can be described in following steps:
Step 1 A selects and downloads GI = {(good1, price1), (good2, price2), …, (good n, price n)} from merchant's website.
Step 2 Then A chooses random integers r 1 , r 2 ∈Z p , a random point P ∈ E(F p ) and computes R 1 = r 1 P A , R 2 = r 2 P and h = H(ID A ).
Step 3 Now A computes K 1 = d A r 1 P B , K 2 = hr 2 P and K = K 1 + K 2 = (k x , k y ).
Step 4 A generates the payment information by computing M = H 1 (GI || e || ID B ), and H 1 (.) is a public one way hash function.
Step 5 A uses k x to compute 1 1 ( || || || || ),
where T 1 current time stamp. Finally A sends (C 1 , R 1 , R 2 , T 1 , ID A ) to the bank.
• Paying phase: upon receiving the encrypted message tuple (C 1 , R 1 , R 2 , T 1 , ID A ), the bank B first withdraws the money from A's account and deposits it to a temporary account. After that, the bank generates a digital signature (DS) to the A's payment information. The bank performs the following steps:
Step 1 First bank computes
Then by using k x , the bank computes
Bank also checks the validity of T 1 .
Step 2 The bank B also verifies if this k x is equal to k x computed in step 1. If T 1 and k x are both correct, then bank accepts this transaction. Otherwise, bank rejects it.
Step 3 Further B deducts the price amount e from A's account and deposits it to a temporary account. Then B selects an expiry E and computes m = M || E. The bank also uses d B to generate a DS on m by using an efficient signature scheme (Khalique et al., 2010) and records {DS, m} in its database.
Step 4 B uses k x to computes 2 2 ( || || || )
and sends (C 2 , T 2 ) to customer A.
Step 5 Upon receiving (C 2 , T 2 ), A computes • Exchanging phase: in this phase, the customer A utilises the received signature DS as the paying proof and performs the following steps:
Step 1 A selects random integers 1 2 , p r r ′ ′ ∈ Z and random point P′ ∈ E(F p ) and
Step 2 A uses x k′ to computes 3 and sends   3  1  2  3 ( , , , , )
to merchant, where T 3 is time stamp.
Step 3 Now merchant computes h = H(ID A ), 1
He also checks whether x k′ and T 3 are correct or not. If these are correct, then merchant accepts this transaction. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Step 4 Now merchant computes to encrypt the electronic goods. After this, the merchant sends C 4 to customer A and keeps the record of {DS, m} in its database.
Step 5 After receiving C 4 , A uses x k′ to compute 4 ( ).
x k electronic goods D C ′ = So finally A obtain the electronic goods that he wants to buy.
• Transferring phase: in this phase, the merchant sends the payment proof to bank B before expiry date. If the customer A does not receive goods, he is having the facility to ask B to stop the transaction. In this case bank transfer the payment money from temporary account to A's account. Otherwise, after the expiry date bank transfer the money to merchant's account and remove the record of {DS, m} from its database.
Security and performance analysis
In this section, we describe the security and performance analysis of our proposed authenticated encryption scheme and e-payment scheme.
Security analysis
In this subsection, we show that our proposed schemes satisfy all the security requirements given by Yang et al. (2013) . The security of proposed schemes relies on symmetric key k x and to generate valid k x , the adversary A need to generate valid R 1 , R 2 .
The detailed security analysis is as follows:
• Replay attack: assume that an adversary A wiretaps the communication between the user A and user B and can obtain a message tuple (C, R 1 , R 2 , T, ID ua ). The adversary can resend a past message (C, R 1 , R 2 , T, ID ua ) to user B. But when user B will receive the message, he will first check the validity of time stamp T. If T is not fresh, B will understand that the message is sent from an adversary A and he discards the message. So our schemes are secure from this attack.
• Outsider attack: as an outsider the adversary A can intercept (C, R 1 , R 2 , T, ID ua ) from the communication between user A and user B. However he cannot obtain M from C as it requires symmetric key k x , which can be obtained by = + which will not be equal to . K Hence the user B will find that message is not coming from user A. So our proposed scheme can prevent this attack.
• Server spoofing attack: in this attack, an adversary A can pretend to be a bank server. For this A generates 1 ( || || || )
x k x C E DS E k T = by using a forged k x and send to user A. However A has to obtain d B to compute K 1 = d B R 1 and so
(k x , k y ) in order to get correct k x , which is infeasible. So our scheme is also secure from this attack.
• Confidentiality: the confidentiality of e-payment scheme can be broken if A can decrypt the cipher text C. In our proposed scheme all the messages are encrypted by using a symmetric key k x and we have proved in outsider attack that k x can only be computed by getting private key d B , which face the difficulty of ECDLP. Hence this attack is not feasible.
• Authenticity: the proposed schemes provide authenticity because only user A can
When the bank computes the same k x to decrypt C 1 , it can check correctness of k x to make sure that M is rally sent by user A. Similarly, only bank can compute k x to decrypt 2 2 ( || || || ).
Thus, user A can ensure that the message (DS || E || k x || T 2 ) is really sent from the bank without verifying DS.
• Integrity: proposed schemes provide message integrity because if any of the parameters (C, R 1 , R 2 , T) is modified then user B will not be able to verify validity of k x or T. So he will simply terminate the session. Although we are not giving any proof but our proposed schemes are also secure from the man-in-middle attack, ID theft attack, privacy protection, none-repudiation and double spending prevention.
Performance analysis
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of our proposed e-payment scheme by comparing it with other e-payment schemes. We use ME, SM, PO, SY, Inv and Ad for modular exponentiation, scalar multiplication of elliptic curve point, pairing operation, symmetric encryption/decryption operation, inversion in * p Z and point addition on elliptic curve respectively. 's (2015) scheme. Since the magnitude of above computation cost can be denoted as Inv > ME > PO > Ad > SM > SY. Therefore in light of table 1, we can say that our proposed scheme is efficient than the others except Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme. However, after the cryptanalysis proposed by Chaudhry, Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme seems insecure. The computation cost of our proposed scheme is little bit more than Yang et al.'s (2013) scheme but is more secure than this scheme. Hence our schemes are efficient and secure than the other related schemes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we cryptanalysed Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme and e-payment system. We proved that both of Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) schemes are vulnerable to impersonate attack. To overcome security weaknesses of Chaudhry et al.'s (2015) authenticated encryption scheme, we proposed improved elliptic curve based authenticated encryption scheme. Our proposed scheme can efficiently accomplish the message encryption and authentication at the same time. By using our encryption scheme, we also proposed an e-payment scheme. We proved that our proposed schemes are secure against all known attacks like replay attack, outsider attack, impersonation attack, manin-middle attack, confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, etc. We also compared performance of our proposed e-payment scheme with the related works. According to the results of this paper, the proposed authenticated encryption and e-payment schemes are efficient and more secure.
